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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitrability is the issue of whether the parties to a contract agreed to
arbitrate a particular claim and are therefore precluded from resolving that
claim in court. 1 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) supports a strong policy
favoring the use of arbitration.2 The FAA dictates that on motions to compel
arbitration, the court, "upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement
for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue," shall order
the parties to arbitration, according to the terms of their agreement. 3
However, "[i]f the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect,
or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily
to the trial thereof."'4
In the 1967 decision of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing,5 the Supreme Court made it extremely difficult for any party
to avoid arbitration. The Supreme Court held that a court "may consider only
issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate."6
The Prima Paint Court established the doctrine of separability, ruling that to
avoid arbitration, claims of fraud in the inducement must specifically go "to
the 'making' of the agreement to arbitrate" itself, not to the entire agreement
generally. 7 From 1967 until recently, courts consistently applied the Prima
Paint ruling to almost all voidable contracts. 8
* Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003).
1 See Carbajal v. Household Bank, No. 00 C 0626, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16458,
at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Sept 18, 2003) (ruling that contractual language stating that "any
dispute" must go to arbitration required the plaintiff to arbitrate his fraud claim).
2 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 16 (1984) (citing FAA legislative
history to support a ruling that Congress could preempt both state substantive and
procedural law by requiring state courts to enforce the FAA).
3 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2002).
4Id.
5 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
6 Id. (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 403-04. The doctrine of separability is the rule that requires an arbitration
agreement and the rest of a single contract to be treated as two distinct agreements.
Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of
Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56
SMU L. REv. 819, 838 (2003).
8 See, e.g., Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that arbitrators
are to decide unconscionability and lack-of-consideration claims that challenge the entire
contract); Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524, 529
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However, in the 2003 case of Spahr v. Secco, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that mental incapacity claims must be decided by a court before
going to arbitration. 9 This decision directly conflicts with a recent Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which held that courts cannot consider a
mental incapacity defense if the parties agreed to submit all disputes to
arbitration. 10 Because of Spahr's divergence from the voidable contracts rule
and its direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit's recent decision, it may prove to
be a milestone decision in the law on arbitrability.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1995, William Spahr opened an investment account at U.S. Bancorp
Investments, Inc. (hereinafter "U.S. Bancorp") through its employee, Melissa
Secco.11 In opening the account, Spahr signed a contract that contained an
arbitration agreement for "any controversy" relating to the account. 12 At that
time, and throughout his dealings with Secco, Spahr was unable to manage
his financial affairs effectively, because he had dementia and Alzheimer's
disease.13
In 1999, Spahr filed suit against Secco and U.S. Bancorp alleging that
Secco "exploited hi[s] mental deficiencies and finagled him out of large
amounts of money and real estate" and that U.S. Bancorp was negligent in
employing Secco in her particular position of trust. 14 U.S. Bancorp filed a
motion to compel arbitration. 15 The District Court of Colorado denied U.S.
Bancorp's motion, finding that the parties' agreement was not legally
(1st Cir. 1985) (holding that arbitrators are to decide mutual mistake and frustration-of-
purpose defenses that do not go specifically to an arbitration agreement); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
arbitrators are to decide duress and unconscionability defenses that fail to challenge the
arbitration clause itself); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263,
1271 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that arbitrators are to decide frustration-of-performance
claims that challenge the entire contract).
9 Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003).
10 Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002).
11 Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1268.
12 Id. Spahr also signed two subsequent agreements with arbitration clauses. Id. at
1268 n.1. However, both the district and appellate courts found these subsequent
agreements to be inapplicable to the claims at issue. Id. at 1268-69, 1274-75.
13 Id. at 1268.
14 Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1268. Spahr claimed that Secco was "'legendary' ... for
convincing elderly men to loan her money in exchange for sex," and therefore U.S.
Bancorp was negligent for employing her in the position she held. Id.
15 Id. Secco requested to join U.S. Bancorp's motion but was denied. Id. at 1268-69.
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enforceable because of Spahr's mental incapacity. 16 U.S. Bancorp appealed,
arguing that Spahr's mental incapacity claim went to the entire contract
generally, and not to the arbitration clause itself.17
Ell. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision, holding that
Spahr's mental capacity defense went both to the entire contract and to the
specific arbitration agreement. 18 The court based its holding on the argument
that, unlike fraud in the inducement, mental incapacity can never be said to
affect only a specific part of an agreement without also affecting the entire
agreement. 19
A. The Spahr Court's Distinction of Prima Paint
In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court ruled that an arbitration agreement is
to be considered separate from the rest of the contract in which it is found,
and the arbitration agreement itself must be induced by fraud in order to
avoid arbitration. 20 The Tenth Circuit viewed such separation reasonable
only because of the possibility that a party either could be fraudulently
induced to make a contract that just happens to contain an arbitration
agreement, or the party could be fraudulently induced to make the arbitration
agreement itself.21 In dicta, the circuit court argued that the possibility of
treating the arbitration agreement separate from the rest of the contract could
not occur with mental incapacity, because mental incapacity is based on a
party's status, which is relatively constant. Fraud in the inducement, on the
other hand, is based on a party's conduct, which can vary when making
agreements. 22
B. The Spahr Court's Lack of Supporting Precedent
The Spahr court arrived at its holding despite the fact that it did not cite
to any prior decisions over the past thirty-six years to support its ruling or
16 Id. at 1268.
17 Id. at 1270.
18 Id. at 1273.
191Id.
20 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04.
21 Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1273.
22 Id. at 1273 n.8 (discussing the status-conduct distinction, referring to E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.1, at 419-20 (2d ed. 1998)).
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analysis.23 Additionally, the court recognized that it failed to follow the
popular distinction between void and voidable contracts, stating that this rule
did not apply to mental incapacity challenges. 24
C. The Spahr Court's Reasoning Compared to the Primerica Court's
Reasoning
While the Spahr court's analysis is based almost exclusively on the logic
that arbitration clauses may not be separable from an overall contract in
terms of certain defenses to the contract,25 other courts have stayed much
closer to the "strong national policy favoring arbitration." 26 In Primerica, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that analyzing a capacity defense would require the
court to address the merits of the underlying dispute, instead of only
considering the "making" of the agreement and resolving all doubts in favor
of arbitration, as required by the FAA and Prima Paint.27 As with many
other courts that have addressed the arbitrability of potentially voidable
contracts, the Primerica court found that a party must make a specific
challenge to the arbitration agreement itself in order to avoid arbitration-
even for incapacity challenges. 28
While the majority opinion in Primerica is representative of many
current arbitrability decisions, the concurrence in Primerica offers an
analysis not addressed by either the Primerica majority or the Spahr court.29
Recognizing that Mr. Brown, the plaintiff seeking to avoid arbitration in
Primerica, had been "profoundly retarded since birth," the concurrence by
Judge Dennis considered the requirements for a court to vacate an arbitration
23 See Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272. In fact, the court cites five decisions in its opinion,
all of which hold that voidable defenses, including mental incapacity, are for arbitrators
to decide. Id.
24 Id. Under the popular void-voidable distinction, void contract claims are decided
by courts, while voidable contract claims are sent to arbitration. Sarah Cole, Commercial
and Labor Arbitration 29 (Winter 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
This distinction is based on the view that a void contract never existed to begin with, so
there never could have been a valid agreement to arbitrate, whereas voidable contracts are
valid, even though they may be voided later by one of the parties. Id.
25 See Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272-73.
26 Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth
Circuit cited Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984), which noted that
Congress, in enacting the FAA, "declared a national policy favoring arbitration." Id.
27 Primerica, 304 F.3d at 471-72.
28 Id. at 472 (citing other Fifth Circuit decisions requiring arbitration of voidable
contracts).
29 Id. at 472-73 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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decision. 30 Judge Dennis concluded that based on the facts in the record, he
knew of no way the contract could be enforced against the incompetent
defendant. 31 Hence, an outcome similar to that of Spahr would be inevitable
under Judge Dennis's analysis. 32 However, it would be achieved in a more
roundabout way-by court review of the arbitration award. 33 Comparing the
Spahr decision with the Primerica opinion, the Primerica concurrence, and
other arbitrability decisions yields several valuable insights, as discussed in
Part IV.
IV. ISSUES RAISED BY THE COURT'S HOLDING AND ANALYSIS THEREOF
Spahr raises several important arbitrability issues. First, Spahr may
promulgate a possible policy shift with respect to arbitration. 34 Second,
Spahr may help define future debate and analysis of arbitrability. 35 Finally,
although Spahr may lead to important answers in the near future, the court
did not address many significant arbitrability issues. 36
A. Possible Shift in Arbitration Policy
The most obvious result of the Spahr decision is that there is now a split
among circuit courts on the arbitrability of contracts challenged by mental
incapacity claims. 37 This split leads to the inevitable question of when the
U.S. Supreme Court will consider the issue. This question is particularly
important given the view by some that there may be a trend by the Supreme
30 Id. at 473. Under Mississippi law, an arbitration decision is to be vacated if the
award is contrary to public policy, is arbitrary and capricious, is in manifest disregard of
the law, or is not drawn from the underlying contract. Id.
31 Id.
32 Both analyses appear to require courts eventually to review the merits of the case
and, if incapacity is found, refuse to enforce the voidable contract.
33 It is important to note that this possibly circuitous procedure appears to contradict
the FAA's purpose and policy of promoting efficiency. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Condin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (noting "the unmistakably clear congressional
purpose that the arbitration procedure . . . be speedy and not subject to delay in the
courts").
34 See infra Part IV.A.
35 See infra Part IV.B.
36 See infra Part V.
37 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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Court to temper the extremely favorable policy toward arbitration established
in Prima Paint.38
If the policy favoring arbitration is shifting, as possibly initiated by First
Options, Spahr may be an excellent case for the Supreme Court to weaken
the tight grip arbitration clauses currently have on parties who sign adhesion
contracts. 39 William Spahr's considerable mental incapacity and Melissa
Secco's egregious form of fraud would seem to give the Court good reason to
adjust the current policy to increase protection for both consumers and
employees bound by adhesion contracts.40 Because of these inequities, the
Tenth Circuit's decision could be the necessary catalyst to enable such a shift
and allow a reevaluation of current policy and circumstances. 41
38 See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04 (creating the doctrine of separability, thereby
making it extremely difficult for any party to avoid arbitration). But see First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-45 (1995) (holding that courts, not
arbitrators, are to decide on the issue of arbitrability unless "clear and unmistakable"
evidence indicates that the parties agreed to arbitrate the arbitrability issue); Cole, supra
note 24, at 28 (questioning whether the Supreme Court's decision in First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan is consistent with Prima Paint). Critics have argued that the
origin of the policy, which Prima Paint purports is based on the FAA and its legislative
history, is not as clear or as strong as put forth in Prima Paint. See Reuben, supra note 7,
at 883 (arguing that the policy put forth in First Options is actually the appropriate policy
supported by the FAA's text and legislative history).
39 See Reuben, supra note 7, at 878-83 (discussing the Supreme Court's apparent
shift toward requiring actual, instead of implied, consent to uphold arbitration
agreements).
40 See id. at 823 (proposing that the procedural safeguards of courts and the
efficiency and benefits of arbitration should both be considered and traded off in
determining arbitration policy). Reuben also suggests that the doctrine of separability, in
particular, no longer has a valid policy-based purpose. Id. at 880-81.
41 See Reuben, supra note 7, at 880-81 (arguing that Prima Paint's doctrine of
separability has served its purpose of deterring judicial hostility towards arbitration, but
has "outlived its usefulness"); see also Cole, supra note 24, at 29-30. However, note that
the first and only case to cite to Spahr as of March 1, 2004 simply grouped Spahr with
other cases that fit within the exception to Prima Paint. Carbajal v. Household Bank, No.
00 C 0626, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16458, at *21 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Sept 18, 2003). The
Carbajal court stated that the Spahr court held the agreement in dispute to be a
"nonexistent" contract. Id. However, the Spahr opinion specifically states that the court
reached its conclusion because the void-voidable "distinction is not dispositive" in mental
incapacity claims. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272. Carbajal, in summarily categorizing Spahr,
maintained the void-voidable distinction and the extremely high Prima Paint standard
required of parties hoping to avoid arbitration. Carbajal, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *21-
24.
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B. Definition of Arbitrability Issues
In considering Spahr and comparing its reasoning with the reasoning in
Primerica, at least three questions arise that will likely help define the issue
of arbitrability in the near future. First, what rule should be used to determine
an arbitration agreement's validity? Second, based on that rule, what is the
proper line between sending a case to arbitration and hearing it in court? And
third, at what point in a dispute should a court apply this rule?
1. Rule for Determining Arbitrability
Before Spahr, the criterion for deciding arbitrability issues was becoming
well established.42 Voidable contracts consistently went to arbitration,
whereas void contracts generally went to court.43 The decision in Spahr
encroached on this voidable contract rule.44 The Spahr court proposed a new
rule based on the inseparability of the arbitration agreement from the rest of
the contract when it is challenged on a claim of mental incapacity. 45 In
essence, this new rule creates an exception to the doctrine of separability
established in Prima Paint.46 In dicta, the Spahr court stated that the test for
this rule would likely be based on whether an arbitrability challenge were
based on the status or the behavior of the parties. 47
Hence, in proposing this new rule and suggesting a possible test for it,
the former rule, requiring voidable-contract challenges to go to arbitration,
was called into question, opening the door for other possible rules to take its
42 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
43 See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 591 591 (7th
Cir. 2001); Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 2000); Three
Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 1991);
Cancanon v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 805 F.2d 998, 999 (11th Cir. 1986);
I.S. Joseph Co. v. Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir. 1986). Each of these
five circuits has refused to require arbitration of void contracts despite the lack of a
specific challenge to the arbitration agreement itself; but each has required voidable
contracts to be arbitrated. Although consensus was being reached, it is notable that the
Fifth Circuit has not yet accepted this distinction. See Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus.
Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1987) (requiring arbitration of an entire
contract that was illegal). But see Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 473
(5th Cir. 2002) (Dennis, J., concurring) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has not specifically
addressed the distinction between void and voidable contracts and the authority of other
circuits making this distinction).
44 Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272-73.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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place.48 Ensuing uncertainty could eventually lead to the complete demise of
Prima Paint's separability rule and the creation of a new rule that mandates
less arbitration than the current rule requires. Any rule allowing more civil
litigation of claims would better protect the rights of individuals to be heard
in court, but would also sacrifice some of the efficiency gained from sending
virtually all disputes over contracts containing arbitration clauses to
arbitration. 49
2. Line Between Arbitration and Court Hearings
If Spahr does lead to a change in the rule for arbitrability, a new line will
be drawn, likely decreasing the currently high degree of invalidity required
for an arbitration agreement and its accompanying contract to be considered
in court. 50 For example, under the current separability rule for which courts
send virtually all voidable contract challenges to arbitration, it appears that a
contract induced by fraud upon a severely retarded child must still be sent to
arbitration. 51 A new rule could change this practice and allow the severely
retarded child the right to sue in court, despite the absence of a specific
challenge to the arbitration agreement itself. Whatever the rule is, courts may
be able to use the Spahr opinion to reevaluate the practical effects of any
arbitrability rule on individuals and to reconsider the appropriate line for
sending cases to court instead of to arbitration.
3. When to Rule on Arbitrability
Considering Spahr, Primerica, and the Primerica concurrence together
may lead courts to analyze contracts more at the pre-arbitration, injunction
stage, instead of merely at the post-arbitration, vacation stage. As noted in
48 Although Spahr may impact the arbitrability of voidable contracts, the
arbitrability of void contracts almost certainly will not be affected, because mental
incapacity challenges only claim that a contract is voidable, instead of void.
49 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
50 Given the fact that so many cases currently go to arbitration, despite the fact that a
party's intent may be absent in many adhesion contracts containing arbitration
agreements, it appears that any changes in arbitrability could only move toward allowing
more cases to go to court. See Reuben, supra note 7, at 858-60.
51 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Although in theory Prima Paint makes
an exception for contract challenges made specifically against the arbitration agreement
itself, in practice there do not appear to be many, if any, adhesion contracts where it can
be shown that the arbitration agreement itself was induced by fraud. See Cole, supra note
24, at 25 (posing the question: "Can you imagine a factual scenario in which a party
fraudulently induced a container contract but not the arbitration agreement?").
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the concurrence in Primerica, a contract made with an incompetent is
voidable, and any finding by an arbitrator upholding the contract would be
vacated on review as contrary to public policy and in manifest disregard of
the law. 52 However, the Primerica majority opinion found that to consider
the facts of such a case before arbitration would be to delve into the merits of
the case, instead of considering only the "making" of the agreement, as
required by the FAA.53 Unlike the Primerica court, the Spahr court sent the
case to be tried in the lower court instead of in arbitration based on the
incapacity claim and the inequitable facts of the case.54
The discrepancy by these courts may lead future courts to reconsider
what constitutes analyzing the "underlying" dispute and merits of the case
versus merely analyzing the making of the agreement. Additionally, courts
may also be led to discuss whether it is even possible to analyze the making
of an agreement at all without considering any merits of the case. If not, the
two rules must be reconciled. In reconciling these rules, courts will be
required to evaluate whether it is better to consider more of the merits of the
case during the injunction procedures or during the arbitration review
procedures. 55 Regardless of the outcome of these analyses, Spahr could serve
an important role in raising these timing issues for further consideration.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the greatest value of Spahr stems from the questions it raises.
Until the Spahr decision, circuit courts routinely applied Prima Paint,
sending almost all cases with arbitrability disputes to arbitration without
much analysis. Spahr may be the impetus necessary to lead other courts to
reconsider more closely the current standing of arbitrability and to resolve
some of the inconsistencies and policy problems of arbitrability that are
facing courts at this time.
Denton Whitney
52 Primerica, 304 F.3d at 472-73 (Dennis, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 471-72.
54 Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1273.
55 The two major policies to consider on this issue are efficiency and fairness. In
considering efficiency, courts must balance saving court resources and time (as judges
scrutinize motions to enjoin arbitration) against wasting parties' time and resources (as
parties argue their case in arbitration only to have a court review and overturn an
arbitration decision upholding a voidable contract). See, e.g., Cole, supra note 24, at 9-
11. In considering fairness, courts must consider the rights of the parties to be heard in
court, at least in terms of their making of the agreement, and the intents and positions of
the parties in signing their agreements. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995); Reuben, supra note 7, at 860-62.
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